COURNOT VS STACKELBERG: THE CASE OF LABOR-MANAGED DUOPOLY

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• First, the equilibrium properties are compared for general Cournot and Stackelberg two-person games with symmetric payoff functions. Second, labor-managed Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly equilibria are compared. Under our assumptions, the Cournot firm's output is larger than the Stackelberg follower's output, which in turn is larger than the leader's output. Dividend per unit of labor is larger for the Stackelberg follower than for the Stackelberg leader, which in turn gets larger dividend per unit of labor than the Cournot firm.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Serizawa Nobuko

  Faculty Of Economics Niigata University

• Okuguchi Koji

  Department Of Economics And Information Gifu Shotokugakuen University

• Okuguchi Koji

  Department Of Economics And Information Gifu Shotoku Gakuen University Gifu Japan

関連論文

• COURNOT VS STACKELBERG: THE CASE OF LABOR-MANAGED DUOPOLY
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• EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM FOR COURNOT OLIGOPOLY-OLIGOPSONY
• Transport Cost in Cournot Duopoly with Several Markets
• Optimal Pollution Tax in Cournot Oligopoly
• CONTRIBUTION TO OLIGOPOLY THEORY: THE CASE OF UNCERTAIN COLLUSIONS
• EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICY FOR INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY

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