Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection

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概要

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• Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998) generalized Long and Soubeyran's lobbying model of protection. They also constructed a simple numerical example with the linear inverse demand and cost functions to illustrate a paradoxical result in which entry of a new domestic firm leads to an increase in the domestic incumbents' profits. This paper shows that the paradoxical result occurs even if cost functions are quadratic. Numerical examples in this paper, together with the one in Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998), indicate that the paradoxical result is more likely if the number of domestic firms is small and if the number of foreign firms is large. JEL Classification Number: D43, D72, F13, L13

• 岐阜聖徳学園大学の論文
• 1999-07-01

著者

• Yamazaki Takeshi

  岐阜聖徳学園大学経済情報学会

• Okuguchi Koji

  岐阜聖徳学園大学経済情報学会

関連論文

• Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Endogenous Rent
• Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection
• Aggregate Welfare of the Anas-Arnott Housing Model

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