Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Endogenous Rent

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概要

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• We formulate one-stage and two-stage rent seeking games with endogenously determined rent. Under reasonable assumptions, both games have a unique pure Nash equilibrium. We derive conditions for aggregate efforts to increase and for the total rent to dissipate as the number of agents increase for the two-stage rent-seeking game. JEL Classification Number: D72, L13, D43, C71, C64,

• 岐阜聖徳学園大学の論文
• 1999-07-01

著者

• Okuguchi Koji

  岐阜聖徳学園大学経済情報学会

関連論文

• Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Endogenous Rent
• Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection

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