The 'Hold-up' Problem with Political Entrepreneurship for Collective Action : An Incomplete-Contract Approach to Collective Goods

スポンサーリンク

概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• The organizing work is a prerequisite for any collective action, but it must be undertaken with a fear of being 'held - up' due to its relation-specific and non-verifiable nature. If compensation for that work is not assured, the incentive for that work is lost. By examining a three-stage game model to illustrate the whole process of providing a collective good, I derive the results (i) that the possibility of collective action depends on whether or not political entrepreneurs can solve the 'hold-up' problem with leadership for collective action, and (ii) that a group optimality can be attained under the leadership of a financially-independent type of political entrepreneur under the condition of costless re-negotiation.

• 広島大学の論文

著者

• 上田 良文

  広島大学大学院社会科学研究科社会経済システム専攻教授

• 上田 良文

  広島大学経済学部

関連論文

• The "Bargaining Power" Theory of the State : A Synthesis of Economic Approaches to the Origin of the State
• 慈善くじによるグローバル・コモンズの保全のための資金調達と人工社会モデルを用いたシミュレーション分析
• 多属性効用分析を用いた森林保全政策の選定
• Social Entrepreneur and NPO : An incomplete contract approach to collective action for public goods
• The 'Hold-up' Problem with Political Entrepreneurship for Collective Action : An Incomplete-Contract Approach to Collective Goods
• Policy Making Process and Pressure groups : A Case Study in the Privatization of Malaysia

スポンサーリンク