<論文>パレート改善をもたらす所得再分配 : 社会契約国家の形成と再分配の役割

概要

論文の詳細を見る
We present an n-person noncooperative game model of a public good provision. This economy consists of a high-income and a low-income group. Our game is the state-formation game that constitutes a punishment rule and settles an enforcer. The enforcer collects equal taxes and provides the public good under the punishment rule. All rules are determined through unanimous agreements. We consider the situation that the public good is not provided under any rules without income redistribution. A voluntary redistribution by the high-income group, however, enables to provide the public good. This induces Pareto improvements, and the real tax burden of high-income persons is heavier than low-incomes' one. These results present a new role of income redistribution and a reason why the state has progressive income taxes.
関西学院大学の論文
2002-03-20