Arbitrations when players have different information
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概要
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Two arbitration procedures, double-offer arbitration (DOA) and combined arbitration (CA), have been proposed to improve the classical final-offer arbitration (FOA) procedure. An important result of DOA and CA is that the offers of disputants crisscross if the disputants share a common estimate about arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement. This paper considers these three arbitration procedures under the assumption that disputants have different information about arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement. In this analysis, we define that the offers converge if they crisscross or they are close in some probability sense, and show that the revised DOA is the only procedure under which the probability that offers converge is always positive.
- 1997-06-01
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