<論説>逐次政策インプリメンテーションと擬態

概要

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The basic structure and functions of the so-called "mimicking" regime of macroeconomic policy-making are investigated here by using a simple one-instrument (money supply)-and-two-targets (inflation and employment) policy model composed of aggregate Lucas-type supply and ordinary demand functions in such a framework of 2-period sequential equilibrium analysis as Persson and Tabellini used, with a seemingly minor but consequently important change in one of the assumptions Persson and Tabellini posited. The assumption is the one concerned with the tough-type government's trade-off between the two targets, and the change is shown to result in a more economically interpretable criterion by which the weak-type can choose between pooling equilibrium with mimicking and separating one without it.
岡山大学の論文