Traffic Network Equilibria with Rational Expectations

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• This paper provides with a new framework for traffic network equilibria with incomplete information. The basic element of our approach is differential information; different drivers have different information about their environment; they choose routes based on their private (differentiated) information. The purpose of this paper is to develop a general equilibrium model that makes explicit information or beliefs that a driver has as part of his/her primitive characteristics. The model we present is a reinterpretation on Harsanyi’s incomplete information game in a network game context. The difference from Harsanyi’s approach is the explicit consideration of rational expectations formation by drivers. A numerical illustration may provide us with a pedagogical insight on traffic network equilibria with incomplete information.

• 東北大学の論文

著者

• Tatano Hirokazu

  Department Of Social Systems Engineering Tottori University

• KOBAYASHI Kiyoshi

  Graduate School of Engineering Kyoto University

• Kobayashi Kiyoshi

  Graduate School Of Civil Engineering Kyoto University

関連論文

• Traffic Network Equilibria with Rational Expectations
• AUTOMOBILE SAFETY DEVICES AND DRIVERS' OFFSETTING BEHAVIOR

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