The Berlin Crisis and Third World Neutralism, 1960-61:The frontier of International Relations 5
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This article explores the role of third world neutralism in the Berlin Crisis of the Kennedy years. Existing works on the crisis have focused on the decision-making processes of the superpowers and their relations with their major allies, while neglecting the impact of the neutralist movement on these powers' handling of the Berlin problem. Meanwhile, studies which scrutinize the ideological background and historical development of the non-aligned movement do not examine what role the neutral countries played in major Cold War conflicts, such as the Berlin Crisis.In contrast, this essay argues that neutralism was one of the major factors of which the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union had to take account in dealing with the Berlin problem in the summer of 1961. As a result of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the neutral countries occupied forty-four of one hundred votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by the end of 1960. In this context, Washington and London were concerned that the neutrals might possibly take the initiative in the UNGA in solving the Berlin problem that would support Moscow's position. The Americans and the British also worried that the neutrals' pro-Soviet stance would embolden Moscow. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, attempted to exploit anti-Western feeling among the neutrals in order to achieve its goals in Berlin. Therefore, the United States and Britain decided to pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union from July 1961 in order to strengthen the Western case in the eyes of the neutral powers. This article also reveals that seemingly irrelevant events in the third world, such as the Bizerte Affair in Tunisia, the first Non-Aligned conference in Belgrade, and the Sixteenth United Nations General Assembly, in fact significantly affected the American, British and Soviet handling of the Berlin Crisis in the summer of 1961.In short, by setting the international context of the Berlin Crisis, neutralism played a more important role in the incident than the existing scholarship has suggested. The increase of newly independent countries and their accession to the United Nations, both of which resulted from decolonization, empowered the neutrals' ability to affect the international events. In this sense, the Berlin Crisis, a Cold War conflict in Europe, and decolonization, a development in the third world, intertwined with each other in the early 1960s. The analysis of this article thus not only reveals the role of minor powers in the superpower conflict, but also portrays the dynamic interactions between the Cold War at the center (Europe) and at the periphery (third world).
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会の論文
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- The Berlin Crisis and Third World Neutralism, 1960-61:The frontier of International Relations 5