権力中枢の除去--ゴルバチョフ政権下における共産党官僚機構の改組
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概要
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The Soviet collapse was one of the most significant events in the 20<SUP>th</SUP> century. The reason for it is still a controversial issue. The party apparat has been regarded as one of the key aspects of the Soviet-type political regime. It is well known that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had controlled state (executive) organs before <I>perestroika</I> through the party apparat's intervention. In addition, it is also well known that the party lost most of its control under Gorbachev's reform. There were two reorganizations of the party apparat under Gorbachev in 1988 after the 19<SUP>th</SUP> Party Conference and in 1990 after the 28<SUP>th</SUP> Party Congress. Researching these reorganizations may help us consider the reason for the Soviet collapse.<BR>This article investigates the decision-making and implementation processes of the party apparat reorganizations, and also looks into the structure and work of the party apparat. Utilising party archives that became available after the Soviet collapse, this article makes clear the following findings. Firstly, the first attempt to reorganize the party apparat in late 1988 had created a "power vacuum, " though the party leadership intended to activate the economy by preventing the substitution (<I>podmena</I>) of the executive organs by the party. When the party stopped intervening in the executive organs, these bodies, which had depended on the party for a long time, also stopped working. The presidency, which was created in March 1990 in order to manage the "power vacuum, " did not properly function either. Secondly, such a situation complicated further reform efforts. The second party apparat reorganization prolonged and not far-reaching especially in relation to security organs, though the party apparat certainly lost most of its ties with other state organs. In addition, despite the party leadership's intention to strengthen "political activity" of the party, the theoretical or ideological work did not improve. Thus, the communist party failed to transform itself into a normal political (or parliamentary) party, partially because of the "power vacuum." Thirdly, losing its traditional administrative function and failing to achieve a new function, the party lost its <I>raison d'être</I>. The party organizations were disintegrating well before Russian President Yeltsin's decree on the suspension of the party's activity that was issued immediately after the attempted coup in August 1991.
- ロシア・東欧学会の論文