係争点の卓越性が対人紛争に及ぼす影響について

概要

論文の詳細を見る
Using 454 college students, experiment I examined the effects of issue-prominence on the bargaining choices in agreement games. The results indicated that in prominence games prominent alternatives coordinated expectations, but that in noprominence games distinctive expectations did not emerge. In experiment II, which uses 60 college students, the subjects engaged in 2-person agreement games. One of the subjects could make a commitment by choosing first and informing the other of his choices before the other's choice. Bargaining efficiency, ie. the number of agreements, did not differ among the conditions. But the contents of agreements differed clearly. In the congruent condition, where the subject who made a commitment could also take advantage of prominence, the agreements were clearly on his side. In the no-prominence condition, the agreements favored the subject who chose first. In the non-congruent condition, the agreement were favorable to the subjects who took advantage of prominence but did not make a commitment. These results are discussed in relation to the effects of role expectation upon bargaining.
日本グループ・ダイナミックス学会の論文