「産構法」に基づく設備処理と共同行為--石油化学工業のケース
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概要
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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the function and performance of joint action (cartelization) to reduce excess capacity in the Japanese petrochemical industry, which was based on the Temporary Measures Law for the Structural Adjustment of Specific Industries, enacted in 1983.<BR>In this paper, we would like to propound a view that the cartel approach can make industrial adjustment smooth by showing the structure of dealing with excess capacity on joint action, and the contribution it makes to promoting productivity. We would also like to consider the conditions for supporting this adjustment style.<BR>The main conclusions of this paper are the following four points:<BR>First, joint action made it possible to escape from a "prisoner's dilemma" in reducing excess capacity. This led to concentration of production, reduction of depreciation cost, and relative stabilization of prices.<BR>Second, this joint action required security: a relaxation of the criteria of facilities disposal, such as a lowering of the accomplishment rate, adoption of a best-share style, and trading of capacity limits.<BR>Third, the capacity share basically determined the share of disposal, but in proportion to the rate of operation the burden of disposal was reduced. Economic loss in pro-rata style was avoided to some extent.<BR>Fourth, and last, there was a difference in the explanatory factor for the facilities disposal rate between the cartel and the non-cartel group. Similarly, there was a difference in their respective disposal rates. In the cartel group (ethylene, LDPE, HDPE), on the one hand, the rate of operation mainly determined the disposal rate. In the non-cartel (PP, EO, SM), on the other hand, the capacity share was the main determining factor. We confirmed statistically that the disposal rate of the cartel group was higher than that of the non-cartel group.
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