国家間の非対称性と環境規制の国際協調について

スポンサーリンク

概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• The purpose of this study was to investigate international cooperation on pollution control between asymmetric countries under uncertainty. We considered any two countries that are asymmetric with respect to their technological level and the amount of environmental damage they incur. Production processes result in the emission of pollutants that are added to the existing pollution stock common to both countries. The stock of pollution evolves stochastically, according to the geometric Brownian motion. The governments of the two countries set their pollutant emission levels at the Markov perfect equilibrium to maximize their expected net present value of social welfare. In addition, they set their pollutant emission levels at cooperative equilibrium to maximize the sum of their expected net present value of social welfare.In cooperative stochastic differential games, a credible cooperative agreement must be subgame consistent. Subgame consistency ensures extension of an optimal policy to a later starting time, and any possible state brought about by prior optimal behaviour of the governments remains optimal.We considered a cooperative game in which the governments of two countries agree to maximize and divide the sum of their expected net present value of social welfare in a way that shares the gain from their cooperation proportional to the relative sizes of their expected non-cooperative net present value of social welfare at every instant of time. In conclusion, the country with a higher technological level or that incurs lower environmental damage obtains a larger instantaneous payoff at the subgame consistent solution.JEL Classification: F18, L13, Q58

著者

• 前鶴 政和

  大阪経済法科大学経済学部

関連論文

• 越境汚染と国際環境政策の確率微分ゲーム分析
• 不確実性下の国際寡占市場における排出削減R & Dについて
• 国際寡占競争下における環境Rの微分ゲーム分析
• 国際寡占競争下における共同研究開発と直接投資について
• 国際寡占競争下における研究開発政策の動学分析
• 国家間の非対称性と環境規制の国際協調について
• 環境ロビイング· 産業ロビイングが国際寡占競争下における環境政策に及ぼす影響について

スポンサーリンク