英国CSCE政策とヨーロッパ・デタント : 西方政策としての東方政策

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Recent Cold War studies have focused on the role of the so-called “third basket” issues, which were stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975, in weakening the European communist states. The power and unmanageable infiltration of western culture to these closed societies obviously had a huge impact on transforming the rigid Cold War structure. However, at the time of signing the Act, most Western participants did not possess a master plan on how to manipulate these issues to overcome Cold War divisions in Europe, nor envisage the demise of communism eventually taking place at the end of 1980s. In reality, the Cold War was expected by many on both sides of the ideological fence to continue for a reasonably long time after 1975. Also, the “third basket” issues were one of least expected articles to be implemented by the communism states.This article explores the rationale for the so-called “third basket” agenda in the negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Final Act from the British governments perspective. It argues that the cultural agenda of the CSCE negotiations, and especially the principle of the “freer movement of people, information and ideas”, was given a double-barreled role. On the one hand, it was superficially an Ostpolitik, aiming to promote mutual understanding among participating states by means of cultural agreements and educational exchanges. However, it was this agenda that prolonged the negotiations at Geneva for two years because of strong opposition from the communist states. Besides, some western states showed an unwillingness to pursue it too vigorously for fear of causing deterioration in their relations with the Soviet Union.On the other hand, this agenda remained a priority for British negotiators in their talks with the Soviet Union. Given the already tense relationship with the Soviet Union, the British government did not have much to lose if it pursued such a sensitive agenda. For Whitehall, the “freer movement of people, information and ideas” was intended to be pursued largely within the context of their existing propaganda policy towards the Soviet Union, while also having the purpose of maintaining alliance solidarity by reminding fellow western societies that the Cold War was not yet over and as such maintaining NATO remained a priority. In this sense, it was essentially a Westpolitik in the guise of an Ostpolitik.As this article shows however, the existence of political strategizing on how to maintain a key alliance even during an era of decreasing tension emphasizes the need for a reconsideration of cultural factors during the Cold War. Moreover, despite Cold War tensions decreasing at the time of détente, the Cold War itself continued for another 15 years. Therefore, what role cultural factors played over the course of this ideological struggle will be examined further.

英国CSCE政策とヨーロッパ・デタント : 西方政策としての東方政策

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