競争的立地の形態と地代収入

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• This paper shows that greater capital accumultation may be achieved under centralized rather than decentralized employment. Centralized and decentralized cities and their related rent profiles can be viewed as outcomes of alternative spatial competitive forces. To see this, rent profiles under spatial monopoly and spatial competition must be derived.If entry occurs at the production center, then due to wage competition by firms the rent will increase. In fact land rents are likely to be higher in cities where several firms locate at the CBD rather than in a “company town” city with a single employer as predicted by our spatial labor market model à la Cournot. In contrast, Löschian entry at the market boundary results in the lowest rent levels around the production center.Aggregate rents are greater when entry takes place at the original production center than when entry occurs at the market boundary. This implies that under certain circumstances national wealth may more effectively be accumulated in the form of urban rent under centralized rather than decentralized employment.

• 日本地域学会の論文

著者

• 若生 徹

  東北学院大学経済学部

関連論文

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• 垂直的市場構造とマージン設定
• 流通機構における空間的逐次寡占および部分的垂直統合
• 共同事業を媒介とした不動産業の後方統合の効果 : Cournot寡占モデル
• 競争的立地の形態と地代収入
• 流通機構におけるチェーンストアと単独店の空間的競争

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