不確実性の下における地主の独占的行動と税の及ぼす影響について
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概要
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In this study, a model for the dynamic optimization behavior of the landowner in the monopolistic land market under uncertainty is presented. The impacts affected by the land property tax on the reservation behavior will be analysed by the numerical simulation.We assume a land market in which there exists a monopolistic landowner who has all the tracts of vacant land having certain location characteristics. The district can only be developed for housing owing to the zoning act. He intends to dispose of all the tracts by sale over time. He is a discriminating monopolist of the first degree in Pigou's sense. The consumer demand price curve faced by him is indeterminate, but the probability density function of the demand price which each (potential) purchaser bids for unit tract of land is known. The probabilistic demand curve is obtained, e. g., by arranging purchasers by mean bidding-price. It is assumed that, for simplicity, disposal by the landowner is selling. The reserved land is used for, e. g., rural uses and the revenues are determinate and stable over time. Or, it is left vacant with no revenues.We also assume a system of transfer taxes which, in effect, completely or at least almost disposseses profits yielded by brokerage. The assumption implies no land broker since he needs to pay opportunity costs of the funds. Furthermore, we assume it to cost prohibitively to make a lot with no housing on it. The last two assumptions imply that land is economically non-transferable over time. Hence, any sale in the land market is made by the monopolistic landowner. The landowner must pay ad valorem transfer tax on the sale of land. He also pays revenue tax on rural uses of the reserved land. If it is left vacant, he must pay the tax rated by the standard rural use. The landowner search for a stream of sales, and maximizes the utility which depends on the mean (expected value) and variance of the present value of the stream of sales (and the revenues, if the reserved tracts are devoted to rural uses). We assume that the landowner is a risk averter. Simulation results will be shown, and the impacts of the land property tax are compared with the impacts under deterministic conditions (Higano [1]).
- 日本地域学会の論文
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- 不確実性の下における地主の独占的行動と税の及ぼす影響について