クリーン開発メカニズムにおける交渉メカニズムと排出枠の認証について

概要

論文の詳細を見る
In recent years, both of developed and developing countries are asked for more positive environmental policies in deep international coalition. One of them is Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The study of this area is increasing. But no studies have ever tried to examine certification of emission credits in theoretical model of CDM.The purpose of this paper is to make it clear that how ex ante and ex post certification effect on the behavior of the host and the donor in CDM through introducing a Stackelberg game model: the government of developing country chooses the CDM project in first stage, and the firm of developed country chooses the pollution abatement in second stage. In conclusion, we provide the policy implications on certification in CDM.Our main results are that operational entities should adopt ex ante certification when the charge rate of certification is higher than a constant value. If the charge rate is equal to the constant value, two certification methods make no difference to both of the government of developing country and the firm of developed country.
日本地域学会の論文