Analysis of Institutional Evolution in Circuit Breakers Using the Concepts of Replicator and Interactor

スポンサーリンク

概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, world financial markets went through a period of economic anarchy in the latter half of 2008. Particularly in October 2008, many world stock exchanges introduced circuit breakers and frequently changed rules for implementing them. In the viewpoint of those who emphasize autonomy and efficiency of markets, these rule changes must be incomprehensible. In order to understand the institutional changes in stock markets, we introduce “replicator” and “interactor” which are key concepts of institutional and economical evolution. We show that market mechanisms such as circuit breakers were formed through evolutionary dynamics motivated by environmental changes in addition to economic efficiency. We maintain that the concepts of replicator and interactor help in understanding institutional evolution.

著者

• Kobayashi Shigeto

  School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST)

• Hashimoto Takashi

  School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST)

関連論文

• Benefits and Limits of Circuit Breaker: Institutional Design Using Artificial Futures Market
• Analysis of Institutional Evolution in Circuit Breakers Using the Concepts of Replicator and Interactor

スポンサーリンク