An RSA-Based Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Secure against Replacement Attacks, and Its Extensions
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
Secure channels can be realized by an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol that generates authenticated session keys between the involving parties. In [32], Shin et al., proposed a new kind of AKE (RSA-AKE) protocol whose goal is to provide high efficiency and security against leakage of stored secrets as much as possible. Let us consider more powerful attacks where an adversary completely controls the communications and the stored secrets (the latter is denoted by “replacement” attacks). In this paper, we first show that the RSA-AKE protocol [32] is no longer secure against such an adversary. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) we propose an RSA-based leakage-resilient AKE (RSA-AKE2) protocol that is secure against active attacks as well as replacement attacks; (2) we prove that the RSA-AKE2 protocol is secure against replacement attacks based on the number theory results; (3) we show that it is provably secure in the random oracle model, by showing the reduction to the RSA one-wayness, under an extended model that covers active attacks and replacement attacks; (4) in terms of efficiency, the RSA-AKE2 protocol is comparable to [32] in the sense that the client needs to compute only one modular multiplication with pre-computation; and (5) we also discuss about extensions of the RSA-AKE2 protocol for several security properties (i.e., synchronization of stored secrets, privacy of client and solution to server compromise-impersonation attacks).
著者
-
SHIN SeongHan
Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science a
-
KOBARA Kazukuni
Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science a
-
IMAI Hideki
Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science a
関連論文
- An RSA-Based Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Secure against Replacement Attacks, and Its Extensions
- Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange: New Construction and Its Extensions
- Extension of Broadcasting Service by Using Electronic Tokens(Contents Technology and Web Information Systems)
- Unconditionally Secure Chaffing-and-Winnowing
- An RSA-Based Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Secure against Replacement Attacks, and Its Extensions
- Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange : New Construction and Its Extensions
- A Secure Construction for Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
- A New Security Architecture for Personal Networks and Its Performance Evaluation
- RSA-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited
- A Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Credential Services
- An Efficient and Leakage-Resilient RSA-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with Tight Security Reduction(Information Security)
- Lightweight Privacy-Preserving Authentication Protocols Secure against Active Attack in an Asymmetric Way
- Asymmetric RFID System Secure against Active Attack
- An Efficient 2-Secure and Short Random Fingerprint Code and Its Security Evaluation
- Tag-KEM from Set Partial Domain One-Way Permutations
- CCA-Secure Public Key Encryption without Group-Dependent Hash Functions
- Security Tightness Evaluation of Fujisaki-Okamoto Conversion in Identity Based Encryption
- Searchable Public-key Broadcast Encryption
- CCA-secure IBE Scheme with Tight Security Reduction based on the Gap BDH Assumption