高齢化社会における福祉政策の経済分析
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概要
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Recently, lots of advanced nations are facing aging problems. The speed of aging in Japan is quite high above all. This means that the number of elderly people per an adult who have to care them socially is increasing. Although it was once natural that elderly parents live with and be cared by their family, it is becoming difficult to do this.Needless to say, the expansion of public elderly services is very important. However, the roll of government is not only supplying it of course. The (national or regional) government have to levy and distribute taxes on people so as to extend social welfare (services) with considering and balancing the satisfaction of all the people in the nation or region.In this paper, we consider the economy like this ; there are elderly and young people, and a regional government. Elderly people suffer from one kind of disutility which accompanies their life. The government carries out the regional welfare policy consisting of the redistribution and the public elderly service. Here, we assume that there is the shadow cost when regional government levy taxes on (or subsidize) elderly people.We also assume that there are both types of elderly and young people that they have family in the same district and not. The elderly people that have their child can reduce (or increase) their disutility if they live with their children. Using this regional society model, we analyze the interaction of the regional welfare policy and the possible bargaining concerning decisions of people to live with family or not.The main results are as follows ; First, independent to the possibility of the bargaining between a parent and his (or her) child, the income of elderly people is qualitatively higher than that of young people after the taxes. Second, in this system of tax collecting, the child would be burdened the strictly positive ratio of their parents pre-bargaining disutility level. Third, if the regional society is quite aging, and if the ratio of the elderly people that dont have family in this district to the elderly that have is less than the shadow cost, then the young people will be levied all the income of them. And even if the ratio of the elderly people that dont have family in this district to the elderly that have is more than the shadow cost, it might be occurred that all income of the young be levied by the government.JEL classification : D31, I31
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