Incomplete information games with multiple priors
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概要
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We present a model of incomplete information games, where each player is endowed with a set of priors. Upon arrival of private information, it is assumed that each player "updates" his set of priors to a set of posterior beliefs, and then evaluates his actions by the most pessimistic posterior beliefs. So each player's preferences may exhibit aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty. We define a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results for them, and demonstrate by examples how players' views on uncertainty about the environment affect the strategic outcomes.
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Blackwell Publishing | 論文
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