名前の規約説と本性説 : プラトン『クラテュロス』433c-435dの解釈をめぐって
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概要
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The Cratylus is Plato's most focused discussion of language - more precisely, of 'the correctness of names' - and, as is often pointed out by commentators, one of his most enigmatic, arcane dialogues. As such, it has posed a great many interpretative problems; one of the problems, which we must deal with in reading the Cratylus, is difficulty in the interpretation of Plato's own stance on the correctness of names. In the Cratylus, Socrates investigates two theories of the correctness of names, which commentators on the dialogue label linguistic 'naturalism' and 'conventionalism', with their respective advocates Hermogenes and Cratylus. So for Plato's own thinking to be 'read off from the flow of the conversation', we must judge how far Socrates accepts and rejects the two theories. However, there is still no agreement in scholarly debate on that issue. There seem to be largely three interpretations of Socrates' final position: (i)a full-blooded conventionalism (ii)a moderate naturalism (iii)a third position. This interpretative discord is derived mainly from disagreement over how to interpret the σκληροτηζ argument. Scholars have dealt with the argument separately from the other parts of the dialogue, without trying to understand the import of the argument in context. Such a limited approach to it, however, might lead to a misunderstanding of the intention with which Socrates discusses the name of σκληροτηζ. In this paper, I take a new approach to the σκληροτηζ argument: this approach essentially consists in examining the argument in connection with a preceding argument, known as the διανομη argument, on the assumption that taking the form of two successive stages, they deal with a common question - the communication of thoughts. In the διανομη argument a fundamental difference between Socrates' account and Cratylus' is made clear: Socrates draws a distinction between the identification of the subject matter and the distribution of a name to it, whereas Cratylus is adamant that a name refers to its object via its descriptive meaning (Chapter 1). In the σκληροτηζ argument Socrates resorts to linguistic convention to explain mechanisms for a name referring to its object (Chapter 2.1), and reaches the conclusion that convention contributes to the correctness of names in such a way that it enables a name to communicate a speaker's thoughts to a hearer(Chapter 2.2). So I take it that Plato's final position is conventionalism, although it should be noticed that up to the σκληροτηζ argument he has had Socrates stick to the naturalistic account as an account of mechanisms for a name conveying genuine information about its referent. I will try to clarify Socrates' manoeuvres and intentions in his refutation of Cratylus' naturalism and to show what is philosophically significant, if any, as to linguistic conventionalism.
- 2014-03-26