Unilateral, Bilateral and Multilateral Actions against Nuclear Proliferation : The Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2002-2006
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概要
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In light of North Korean efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, this paper explores the efficacy of various forms of action taken by governments to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. Specifically it focuses on the crisis on the Korean Peninsula beginning in October 2002 with the discovery of North Korea's active nuclear program and continuing until March, 2006 when intensive multilateral negotiations ended in stalemate. In this paper I take this crisis as a case study and test two hypotheses. The first is that unilateral action in the form of military threats and arms build-ups are relatively ineffective counter-proliferation actions; and the second is that multilateral efforts to make the acquisition of nuclear weapons more difficult or to reduce the need for them are more likely to be successful. The crisis provides evidence to support the first hypothesis. As long as North Korea and the US traded unilateral threats and continued to work towards the deployment of increasing numbers of weapons to use against each other, the crisis continued to worsen. The second hypothesis, however, found no support because the crisis remained unresolved. The various rounds of six-nation talks involving North Korea, the US, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea failed in the end. The author offers a series of proposals including that arms control agreements should be based on a recognition that nuclear weapons are ultimately unusable in that they can achieve no valid purpose.
- 北東アジア学会の論文
- 2006-10-01
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関連論文
- Unilateral, Bilateral and Multilateral Actions against Nuclear Proliferation : The Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2002-2006
- U.S. Missile Defense Policy and International Security : Implications for East Asia