探求することと想起すること : 『メノン』81-86を中心に
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概要
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This paper seeks to place Plato's introduction of the theory of recollection in the Meno in the context of his methods of enquiry as they develop over the course of his dialogues. In particular, I ask whether Socrates's recourse to recollection represents a break from the elenctic method of Plato's earlier dialogues. For quite a few scholars, Socrates moves on to recollection after elenctic cross-examination has allowed him to progress as far as possible toward the truth; many holding this view imply that elenctic cross-examination and recollection are, if they overlap to some degree, different in process (I call this "reading A"). In this paper, I reject this reading. It is generally agreed that the first half of the slave-boy demonstration represents the structure of the first half of the Meno (70a-80d) and that of Plato's earlier dialogues. I have no disagreement with this: indeed all these passages contain the interlocutor's false belief of knowing something, Socratic refutation of it, and the interlocutor's aporia. I call this "agreement B". However, there is a passage that has been disregarded in the recent literature, i. e. "searching and learning is as a whole recollection" at 81d4-5. I call this "thesis C". From the conjunction of A, B and C, I think it would follow that there was no virtual "searching" in the first half of the Meno nor in Plato's earlier dialogues, since "searching is recollection"(via C). This is the point that I think should be re-examined. First, there is a long-standing tradition concerning "thesis C"- it has been habitually paraphrased as "learning is recollection", while "searching" is omitted. This paraphrase might easily mislead us to an impression that recollection is related only to a constructive procedure, not to a destructive one. Further, the stress on "learning" in "thesis C", achieved by neglecting the "searching", tends to exclude from recollection both the possibility of attaining false beliefs and that of failing to reach knowledge. Thus, it seems natural to infer that only the last stage in the slave-boy demonstration is identified as recollection. However, this line of interpretation contradicts the text. My scrutiny of the related passages suggests that the pivotal moment for recollection seems to exist in the slave-boy being sequentially questioned by Socrates and the answers the slave-boy gives. The recollected beliefs in question are sometimes expressed as plural, not restricted to the final answer of the geometrical proof, and indeed, "au(again)" at 84a3 may suggest that the recollection starts far before the slave-boy's aporia. Both the attainment of the false beliefs and the failure to reach knowledge will not deter us from thinking that they are included in recollection-they will become useful in clarifying the network of our beliefs, e. g. in the way that we judge false things as such. My conclusion is that elenchus is a method fully backed by recollection, and that the first half of the Meno and Plato's earlier dialogues can be taken in this light.
- 2009-03-26
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関連論文
- 探求することと想起すること : 『メノン』81-86を中心に
- 書評 H. H. Benson, Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Plato's Early Dialogues