ローマ外交と紀元前二〇〇年晩秋の開戦 : 第二次マケドニア戦争をめぐって

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The aim of this article is to put forward a new historical interpretation of the Second Macedonian War, by focusing on Roman diplomatic efforts toward the Hellenistic States before the outbreak of the War in the late fall of 200 B.C.E.. As a consequence of the First Macedonian War, Rome had become diplomatically isolated, and Macedonia had secured dominance over the Hellenistic States as a result of the Phoenice Treaty of 205 B.C.E.. However, immediately after the conclusion of the Second Punic War of 201 B.C.E., Rome decided to embark upon a new campaign against Macedonia. In the context of the lengthy Second Punic War severely exhausting Rome and dampening the will for war among the Roman people to an unprecedented low, the deployment of troops in the autumn of 200 B.C.E., even against the backdrop of various diplomatic events, stands out as peculiar. In trying to explain this march to war, researchers to date have cited a heightened sense of crisis in Rome brought on by rumors of an alleged secret pact between Macedonia and Syria to divide Egypt. In response to these interpretations, the author of this article examines the circumstances and preparations made in Rome leading up to the deployment of troops, Rome's actions towards the Hellenistic States up until that time, and the state of affairs prior to the war with Greece and Asia Minor, including Roman allies, Rhodes and Pergamum. Through this analysis, the author concludes that ultimately, the Second Macedonian War was neither a preemptive strike meant to counter any secret pact, nor a war of defense. Rather, in its deployment of troops against Macedonia, Rome was responding to the changing situation in Greece and saw a unique opportunity to seek revenge.
2010-10-20

著者

伊藤雅之
日本学術振興会

ローマ外交と紀元前二〇〇年晩秋の開戦 : 第二次マケドニア戦争をめぐって

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