A Combinatorics Proliferation Model with Threshold for Malware Countermeasure
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概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
Security software such as anti-virus software and personal firewall are usually installed in every host within an enterprise network. There are mainly two kinds of security software: signature-based software and anomaly-based software. Anomaly-based software generally has a "threshold" that discriminates between normal traffic and malware communications in network traffic observation. Such a threshold involves the number of packets used for behavior checking by the anomaly-based software. Also, it indicates the number of packets sent from an infected host before the infected host is contained. In this paper, we propose a mathematical model that uses discrete mathematics known as combinatorics, which is suitable for situations in which there are a small number of infected hosts. Our model can estimate the threshold at which the number of infected hosts can be suppressed to a small number. The result from our model fits very well with the result of computer simulation using typical existing scanning malware and a typical network.
- 一般社団法人情報処理学会の論文
- 2010-03-15
著者
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Kazumasa Omote
Japan Advanced Institute Of Science And Technology (jaist)
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Omote Kazumasa
Japan Advanced Inst. Of Sci. And Technol. (jaist)
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Kazumasa Omote
School Of Information Science Japan Advanced Institute Of Science And Technology
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Takeshi Shimoyama
Fujitsu Laboratories, Ltd.
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Satoru Torii
Fujitsu Laboratories, Ltd.
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Takeshi Shimoyama
Fujitsu Laboratories Ltd.
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Satoru Torii
Fujitsu Laboratories Ltd.
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