Impersonation Attack on Two-Gene-Relation Password Authentication Protocol (2GR)(Fundamental Theories for Communications)

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• In 2004, Tsuji and Shimizu proposed a one-time password authentication protocol, named 2GR (Two-Gene-Relation password authentication protocol). The design goal of the 2GR protocol is to eliminate the stolen-verifier attack on SAS-2 (Simple And Secure password authentication protocol, ver. 2) and the theft attack on ROSI (RObust and SImple password authentication protocol). Tsuji and Shimizu claimed that in the 2GR an attacker who has stolen the verifiers from the server cannot impersonate a legitimate user. This paper, however, will point out that the 2GR protocol is still vulnerable to an impersonation attack, in which any attacker can, without stealing the verifiers, masquerade as a legitimate user.

• 社団法人電子情報通信学会の論文
• 2006-12-01

著者

• Lin Chun-li

  Department Of Computer Science And Information Engineering Shu-te University

• HUNG Ching-Po

  Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Shu-Te University

• Hung Ching-po

  Department Of Computer Science And Information Engineering Shu-te University

関連論文

• Impersonation Attack on Two-Gene-Relation Password Authentication Protocol (2GR)(Fundamental Theories for Communications)
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