色の自然主義的な理解
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投稿論文1. 序2. 色をめぐる哲学的議論の現状 2.1. 感覚質としての色 2.2. 第二性質としての色3. 二つの論争とその構図の相違 3.1. 色の主観主義と色彩科学 3.2. SMSと物理主義4. 色の議論の再設定 4.1. SMSと説明ギャップ 4.2. 表象内容の外在主義 4.3. 内在主義と外在主義 4.4. 色覚モデルと情報内容5. 結論When we see sky at sunset, we have an experience of the bright red quality. Or when you pinch your arm skin, you experience sharp pain. Philosophers have called "subjective" qualities in these experiences "qualia". In philosophy of mind, qualia have been thought of as roadblock to naturalistic understanding of mind. In many arguments colors have been used as a typical example of qualia. Traditionally, ever since Locke classified color as "secondary quality", it has been regarded as mental property that is only in mind, and philosophers have discussed its ontological status. In recent years, philosophers have taken the existance problem of color to discuss intensively in accordance with the development of color science. At first glance, current discussions of qualia and secondary quality seem to have same frameworks: Some philosophers in one school argue that it is impossible to understand color naturalistically, and philosophers in the other school argue that it is possible. However, the conflict, which has been seemingly considered as one between subjectivism and objectivism, in the current discussion about color as secondary quality should be understood as one between internalism and externalism, discussion of qualia. In this paper, it is argued through our that internalism and externalism are not in opposed position, but rather they are compatible and complementary when we explain our color experiences.