アリストテレス探究論における「何であるか」と「何故にか」との同一性について
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概要
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In his Posterior Analytics B, Aristotle shows how demonstration functions in grasping what a thing is The peculiar feature of his theory of inquiry is expressed at the end of B8 that inquirers can grasp "what it is" through demonstration On this feature, I argue that the main theme of the book B is the inquiry of "what it is" The relevant argument through B1-10 depends on the identity thesis of "what it is" and "why it is" The thesis is, I claim, supported by the conception that definition reveals what it is, which I call 'the basicness of definition' Unless we make the identity thesis clear, we may fall into either of two possible moves (1) Some scholars claim that the aim of the book B is to establish the theory of definition which reveals the essence But, Aristotle's theory of definition requires further arguments, which are deployed in the Topics and the Metaphysics (2) Some other scholars claim that the main aim consists in investigating how demonstration appropriately works in the theory of inquiry However, then, what at all does demonstration make clear in an inquiry ? I diagnose they are forced to claim that the goal of the theory of demonstration is confined to offering a method of inquiry into "why it is" which is revealed by cause We have to clarify the role of "what it is" question which is another engine of Aristotle's inquiry In order to show 'the basicness of definition' which runs underneath his argument throughout B1-10, I examine the identity thesis which is mentioned four times and expressed in different wording Especially in B8, "what it is" is identified with "the cause of if it is" "If it is" and "what it is" are within the same route of inquiry which is expressed by the single term We seek for "if it is" (Does X exist?) When we grasp that it exists, then we seek for "what it is" (What is X ?) In both cases the question is rendered in a simple form We can find in the identity thesis above quoted in B8 both the question form in a single term and causation The question form is not merely confined in the linguistic level, rather the simple form of the question "what it is" is epistemologically connected with inquirers' recognition of the thing in itself by the basicness of definition The basicness of definition is led through the argument in the traditional framework of the theory of inquiry which is developed in B3-7 Therefore, the basicness of definition does not presuppose the Aristotelian theory of demonstration which is developed in B8 Since the basicness of definition proffers an epistemological framework which corresponds to the simple form of question "what it is", both "what it is" and "the cause of if it is" of the identity thesis are connected with each other in terms of the same form of question which belongs to the simple route of inquiry
- 2006-03-07