『エウテュデーモス』篇の問題 : 「有益性」と「使用」
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
This paper examines the so-called Protreptic parts of Plato's Euthydemus (Euthyd. 278E-283B[=PL(1)]; 288D-292E[= PL(2)]), and investigates the characteristics of wisdom or knowledge to show the basic misunderstanding of the traditional interpretation. I (1) The argument as a whole derives from the concern of Socrates' and others' that young Cleinias will become as good as possible (Euthyd. 275A) , so that the matter of 'becoming good' is meant to apply to us as well. The argument of PL(1) can be summarized as follows : (i) the realization of our happiness through possession of many good things; (ii) the demand that we use these things correctly to attain some benefit ; (iii) the requirement of wisdom or knowledge to guarantee correct use ; (iv) the necessity of searching for and loving wisdom or knowledge, namely philosophy. (2) From this summary, PL(1) seems to be Plato's real argument in favor of philosophy, and to indicate the Socratic eudaimonism. However, its more complicated figure is revealed as our investigations proceed : (a) The four 'cardinal' virtues are treated in the same way as wealth and other good things, namely as 'things' (πραγματα; 282A2). Meaning that they are supposed to be able to stand in some way independently from their owners, namely ourselves. (b) Such a treatment will almost inevitably invite these questions : what does using temperance, courage, or justice mean ; what is correct use ; what is the content of the benefit resulting from their correct use, and who are 'we' that supposedly benefit by their correct use. It is in the basic understanding of wisdom itself that these kinds of questions culminate. Yet they are unanswered and remain implicit in PL(1). Traditional interpretations believe that PL(1) shows Plato's real speech recommending the activity of philosophy. However, our scrutiny has shown that the situation plausibly suggests a problematic feature of Protreptic Logos, and if PL(1) ended with a declaration of the necessity of philosophical activity, such an interpretation could be sustained. Yet, in fact, PL(2) which clearly continues PL(1) finally ends with an anopia or impasse. II (1) PL(2) asks the question: if philosophy is the acquisition of some wisdom or knowledge, which wisdom or knowledge must we rightly acquire? The argument is still led by both the question of how we benefit and consideration of the context of acquisition or possession and use(cf. 288E1-2 ; 289B4-6 ; 290D5-7). PL(2) then proceeds to the test of kingship or royal art which is apparently the most plausible candidate, if it is knowledge that can achieve and supply our happiness. Consideration of knowledge, finally arrives at the question, in what respect are people good, and in what aspect are they useful. These remain unresolved. (2) We insist that we must take this ρπορια or impasse as such, and search for its significance and origin. (a) That final ironical situation signifies that 'being good' can not possibly be evaluated by connecting good things with ourselves through the context of possession and use. (b) The origin of this impasse can be traced back to the thought that we can be good or happy by possessing many good things. These things were, in fact, unreflectingly and unquestionedly presupposed to stand as good even outside ourselves. The final indecision within the most crucial point of determining in what respect we are good is undersood to suggest that our being good or happy, can not justly be considered by the presupposition of such a grasp on 'good' things. We could say that the more we are inclined to such a possessive thought, the more suggestive and significant the perplexing situation can be for all of us. Philosophy, when considered the acquisition of knowledge to obtain some type of benefit, remains empty and senseless. We can not, therefore, accept the traditional interpretation as seeking a genuine Protreptic Logos in PL(1) and PL(2) of the Euthydemus.
- 1993-03-23
著者
関連論文
- Robert Heinaman ed., Aristotle and Moral Realism., Pp. vii+239, UCL Press, 1995
- 『エウテュデーモス』篇の問題 : 「有益性」と「使用」
- URMSON, J. O., Aristotle's Ethics., Pp.vii+130, Basil Blackwell, Oxford/New York, 1988., hb £19.50 ; pb £6.95.