行為の始まりとしての人間 : Ethica Nicomachea III 5を手懸りとして
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
According to Aristotle, the major and minor premises of a practical syllogism necessarily lead to a conclusion, which is an action itself This account has evoked many different interpretations, but they seem only half-way solutions to this problem This suggests the need to reconsider the exact meaning of voluntanness, and to investigate an aspect of Aristotle's theory of action other than the practical syllogism itself In this paper, I attempt to articulate Aristotle's fundamental view by examining controversial arguments of EN III 5, where he offers the important thesis that a human being originates action In EN III 5, Aristotle argues against his opponent, who denies the voluntariness of vice The opponent's argument is composed of the following three steps S1 A vicious (particular) action caused by some types of ignorance is involuntary S2 A vicious action forced by some types of character is involuntary S3 Vice is 'by nature' Therefore, we have no control over the end (τελοζ) of action. Although S1 seems irrelevant to the theme of EN III 5, which is whether or not vice is voluntary, such is not the case For these three arguments are propounded ta make clear what Aristotle thinks to be a central issue of action theory namely, the relation between particular actions and a human being Aristotle's discussion on S2 and S3, which purports to explain a human being in view of character (εξιζ), has some intricate explanations, especially m respect of the relation between means-end structure and character. Such intricacies, however, do not mean that Aristotle's counterargument is self-defeating and fails to refute his. opponent Rather, these seemingly misleading arguments lead us to the following conclusion The opponent in S2 and S3 is indeed right when he thinks that what is pleasant or beautiful does not make an action involuntary, if such things necessitate his performing the action But he rejects ascription of responsibility to 'himself by means of another criterion of involuntariness, namely, 'ignorance' of τελοζ But the ignorance of τελοζ does not assure involuntariness of action in the same way as do the particular circumstances of the action In other words, even if someone acts 'because of ignorance' of τελοζ, this does not mean that he is not committed to any decision of means In order to make this point clear, we need to distinguish τελοζ, as 'things desirable both in themselves and for the sake of other thing's, from simple instruments For, τελοζ in the former sense has an internal relation between means and τελοζ, and forms character (εξιζ) through the repetition of the same type of particular action Accordingly the most crucial fault of Aristotle's opponent is in not acknowledging the significance of inquiring into the internal structure of his εξιζ Aristotle's criticism would carry validity for someone else who, without understanding the relation between means-end structure and character, simply accepts the opinion that virtue is voluntary
- 日本西洋古典学会の論文
- 1989-03-15
著者
関連論文
- H. Weidemann, Aristoteles Peri Hermeneias : Aristoteles Werke in deutscher Ubersetzung Bd.1/T.2., Pp.viii+483, Akademie Verlag, 1994. / C. W. A. Whitaker, Aristotle's De Interpretatione : Contradiction and Dialectic, Pp.x+235, Oxford, 1996.
- 行為の始まりとしての人間 : Ethica Nicomachea III 5を手懸りとして
- SEIDL, H., Aristoteles ; Zweite Analytiken. Mit Einteilung, Ubersetzung und Kommentar., Pp.356, Konighausen u. Neumann, Wurzburg, 1984, DM 50.