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The mismatch and duplication of Aristotle's two well-known discussions of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics, books 7 and 10 have been discussed at length to find their proper consistency Pleasure is said, on the one hand, to be an unhindered activity of our natural faculties (1153a14-15), and on the other hand, those of completing or perfecting activities, but must not be identified with them(1174b14-1175b1, 1175b 32-35) The core of the problem is thought to be concerned with the concept of activity (ενεργεια) or the relation between pleasures and activities Recently G. E L. Owen suggested that the two discussions are too divergent to be incompatible because they are neither competing nor co-operating answers to one question, but, rather, respective answers to two quite different questions Needless to say, his point is so serious that it cannot be solved by mere explanations from the developmental view-point of Aristotle's ethical thought Although Owen's analysis is brilliant and surely epoch-making, I suspect his thesis is too strong, because several points of Aristotle's argument, especially the refutation of the anti-hedonistic doctrine, are common to both books It is necessary to investigate the respective contexts introducing "activity" before considering the linguistic analysis of human actions, apart from the text of E N For the evaluation of pleasure, which, as J Annas assumes, is common to both books and irrelevant to the apparent difference between them, depends at least partly on the character of activity In book 7 "energeia" appears 12 times, half of which converge at 1152b33-53a 17. This is the second part of the refutations of the anti-hedonistic theory, where Aristotle rejects the view which identifies pleasure with the physiological process (γενεσιζ), and replaces the activity for it on the basis of the facts that we have pleasures without preceding pains and that sick persons take delight in different things from those healthy ones take pleasure in The question in this context is what is the proper description of pleasure when one feels it, so it is clear that activity and process make an exact counterpart Pleasures can be said to be different from one another according to pleasant things, which are certainly not activities but their objects or sources Admission of variety of pleasures is an important aspect of Aristotle's view of pleasure common to both books For the assumption of pleasure as a unified kind without taking variety of actions provides the ground of (moral and psychological) hedonism (Cf. Gorg. 499B, Phzleb. 12C-E) But it should be noted that in book 10 variety of pleasures is based on that of activities "energeia" is used 40 times (including the verbal infinitive form 10 times), most of which appear after 1174b5 making the central concept in the text Aristotle begins with the case of perceptions. If a sense in the best conditioned organ is in a certain relation to its finest objects, it is most complete, and its activity is necessarily pleasant And then the pleasure intensifies its source activity, and this operation is peculiar to human activity Thus in Aristotle's supposition that activities of a different kind are completed by pleasures of a different kind, we find another understanding of human pleasure : the verbs such as "like", "enjoy", "delight", "indulge" have the intentional aspect, which is different from the unified indistinct kind of pleasure as an overall satisfaction of desire
日本西洋古典学会の論文
1987-03-30

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荻野弘之
上智大学

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