アリストテレスの場所論

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"What is Place?" To this question Aristotle proposes four possible answers: form (ειδο&b.sigmav;) , matter (υλη) , the empty interval (διαστημα) between the extremities of the containing body and the limit of the containing body (περα&b.sigmav; του περιεχοντο&b.sigmav;), and examines these possibilities one by one. First, both place and form contain things so that we could say they are similar in this respect. But, while form is the boundary of the contained body and not separable from it, place is the boundary of the containing body and separable from the contained one. So we must say place is not form. Second, both place and matter receive qualities or other limitations, and in this respect they somehow seem to resemble each other. But, while matter is neither separable from the thing nor contains it, place is separable from it and contains it. So, also in this case, we must say matter is not place. The third possible answer, that is, the empty interval seems to be most appropriate as the explanation of place. But Aristotle denies even this answer. His main argument is as follows. If there were an interval which existed by itself(καθ' αυτο ειναι) , it would be a hypostatized κενον, which would further demand its own place to be in, so that there would be a place of place ad infinitum. (This argument of Aristotle seems in my opinion not to be so successful. But even if it fails, it reveals, by his strong denial of the existence of κενον, his conception of κοσμο&b.sigmav; which matters to us. Thus the only remaining answer is the fourth, that is, "the first unmoved limit of the containing body(πρωτον ακινητον περα&b.sigmav; του περιεχοντο&b.sigmav;)" which is indeed to be the final definition of place by Aristotle. This definition has two important characteristics. One point : Place as Aristotle understands it, is not an independent reality but the relation of a containing body to a contained one. In other words, place is an attribute of bodies. Another point: Although place as above said is the relation between bodies, it does not necessarily mean that place is a relative phenomenon. Rather, he says, the containing body realizing the role of place must be unmoved. From this it follows that place as a relation must be based on an absolute measure. This measure is just the everlastingly revolving circumference of the universe (κοινο&b.sigmav; τοπο&b.sigmav;)and the four ringed layers of the elements fire, air, water, earth-(οικειο&b.sigmav; τοπο&b.sigmav;)whose unalterable absolute arrangement in the incessant change into one another imitates the constant movement of the heaven. This fact that the elements have a natural tendency to move towards their own(respectively different)places is the very reason why he denied so strongly the existence of the void which implies the negation of all differentiation. Conclusion: the universe which is reflected in his theory of place is a finite(πεπερασμενον) and complete (τελειον) universe which is so densely filled (πληρε&b.sigmav;) by bodies that it has no empty interstices at all. Actually there exists no infinite thing. In ontology he was essentially the most genuine successor to Parmenidean theory of being.
日本西洋古典学会の論文
1979-03-29

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岩田靖夫
東北大学

アリストテレスの場所論

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