『テアイテトス』184B-186Eをめぐって

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Plato's argument in Theaetetus 184B-186E, which is his refutation of the thesis that knowledge is perception, has opposing interpretations of even fundamental points, such as, what is the main point of the argument or what is the ground of the refutation: one of which is the interpretation of F. M. Corn ford, H. F. Cherniss and perhaps A. J. Holland, and the otheris that of G. Ryle, G. E. L. Owen, I. M. Crombie and J. M. Cooper. I advance my own interpretation in the examination of the views of these two groups. Cornford's interpretation of the argument implies, I think, the same scheme as in Sophist 248A10-12 : [A] αωματι μεν ημα&b.sigmav; γενεσει δι' αισθησεω&b.sigmav; κοινωνει-γενεσιν δε αλλοτε αλλω&b.sigmav;, δια λογισμου δε ψυχη προ&b.sigmav; την οντω&b.sigmav; ουσιαν-ην αει κατα ταυτα ωσαυτω&b.sigmav; εχειν. The case is the same with Cherniss whose view is that Republic 523-525 is 'parallel' to Theaetetus 184-186. But the scheme of Theaetetus 184B-186E is just as follows: [B] τα μεν αυτη δι' αυτη&b.sigmav; η ψυχη επισκοπειν, τα δε δια των του αωατο&b.sigmav; δυναμεων. Cooper's interpretation belongs to the latter[B]and, as far as this point is concerned, Cooper and his group are right. The argument of Theaetetus 184B-186E is, however, in a sense 'independent of the theory of flux', but it is clear that the thesis that knowledge is perception is coherent with the Heraclitian universal flux theory in a wider sense, opposed to Eleaticism(as stated in 160D) , and that the argument here is Plato's final refutation of the thesis. Therefore the theory of knowledge or the epistemology in this place is not 'Plato's' 1 cannot agree to the claims of Owen and Cooper that 'Plato ascribes ουσια to the objects of perception' or 'Plato says about objects of perception that they exist'. But this does not mean that Plato's rejection of the thesis that knowledge is perception is on the ground of the theory of Ideas, nor that the theory of knowledge in the Theaetetus is the same as that already expressed in the Phaedo or the Republic. I think that in the epistemology of the Theaetetus Plato refrains from using the theory of Ideas as much as possible, and tries to reveal the difficulties of his opponent's view with the same logic and on the same ground as his opponent: the feature and particularity of the theory of knowledge in the Theaetetus is that Plato does not bring forward positively his own epistemological doctrine on the basis of the theory of Ideas, but treats the problems of perception in 'the everyday world'. So the arguments of the theory of knowledge in the Theaetetus are not quite enough, and therefore we could not find here simply the development of Plato's theory of knowledge from the middle dialogues to the later ones. My view stated above I try to prove by examining several striking points in the interpretations of Corn ford, Cherniss, Cooper and others.
日本西洋古典学会の論文
1976-03-31

著者

北嶋美雪
学習院大学

『テアイテトス』184B-186Eをめぐって

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