Phaedo 102B3-103C9 : プラトンの「一と多」とアリストテレスの「主語的なものと述語的なもの」の問題の一断面

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概要

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• Plato's formula of the One and the Many, as ιδεα and the sensibles respectively, is comprised in the recognition of Beauty itself and many beautiful things, without regard to their being man, horse, clothes etc Strictly speaking, these beautiful things are not beautiful man and horse, etc, but simply 'the many beautifuls'-whereas in Aristotle such a concept is inadmissible in his system a horse as a substance must be recognized as the substratum of the 'beautiful' In Phaedo 102 B3 ff, however, Simmias is said to be grasped independently and absolutely as a participant in the ιδεα(e g in the ιδεα "the Tall" or "the Small") and always remains as he is (i e having identity), no matter what ιδεα he takes In this trend of thought, does Plato recognize Simmias as a kind of substance=substratum, as Aristotle hold ? If so, does not Plato explain only alteration (αλλοιωσιζ) in his "causal" theory of ideas ? And does he recognize the independent reality of the so-called particulars (i e of physical things) apart from the ιδεα ? αλλοιωσιζ, however, even in Aristotle, is not αλλοιωσιζ simply because it is the alteration of qualities In order to be αλλοιωσιζ, the qualities to be changed must be the proper qualities, winch belong to the Substance itself (Arist De gen et corr, A 4, 319b 10 ff) But in the case of Plato the change can never be explained satisfactorily in terms of the changeable things, but only in the fact of their participation in the ιδεα so also the above-mentioned change in Simmias is not the change of his properties, which are primarily attached to Simmias himself The case is, strictly speaking, not then that Simmias became beautiful, but that something beautiful happened in Simmias Therefore Simmias here is only a locus in which Beauty appears-never a substance which has the quality "beautiful" in itself What, however, is Simmias as a locus ? Indeed he may not possess such a quality as beauty, yet we tend to attribute the term "man" and other definitions to Simmias as his inherent qualities But Plato never recognized Simmias as a Substance qua ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, Even in Aristotle, Simmias qua Simmias is not the same as Simmias qua ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, but only something combined with various attributes which belong to the respective categories In Plato, still more, Simmias is never identical with the "man as immanent ιδεα" -Thus, ultimately, both philosophers recognize that Simmias is different from ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, but the understanding of the content of this so-called Simmias qua Simmias is utterly different in the two cases whereas in Aristotle qua Simmias is thought to have all the distinct qualities which characterize the concrete man Simmias, in Plato, the so-called Simmias qua Simmias is understood as having no distinct attributes, when he loses the connection with the ιδεα of man It is this "Simmias" of which Plato speaks when he describes him as the participant in the "Tall" and "the Small" For in the case of Plato two propositions (1) "This fire is hot" and (2) "This fire is beautiful" are differentiated from each other, and may be put as follows the former (1) shows that the ειδοζ "Fire" is combined with the ειδοζ "Hot" eternally and essentially So it is changeable into a universal proposition But in the latter (2), because fire is not always beautiful, it is not a combination between the ειδοζ "Fire" and ειδοζ "Beauty" So in this case we can only assert "this thing is beautiful" In Plato's thought we can never grasp this event in the form "This fire is beautiful" So it follows that the relation between substance and attributes in the system of Aristotle is, from Plato's standpoint, the reverse of the relationship of the One and the Many Aristotle refers the many attributes to "this fire" as the One Plato does not In Plato's way of thinking the One in this case remains in the "Fire" as ατομον ειδοζ this fire cannot be regarded as the One, for the concept "this fire" is always divided into two parts-the undefined "this thing" and the ειδοζ "fire" And the participant in the Idea is always "this thing", not "this fire" or "this horse", etc

• 日本西洋古典学会の論文
• 1962-03-31

著者

• 松永 雄二

  九州大学

関連論文

• RORTY, A. O.(ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics., Pp. viii+438, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980.
• 付帯性の問題 : ウーシアの間のための一つの予備的考察
• Phaedo 102B3-103C9 : プラトンの「一と多」とアリストテレスの「主語的なものと述語的なもの」の問題の一断面
• 劇"Antigone"の統一性についての一つの覺書 : 主として905-12行の眞僞問題を含む第四Epeisodionの解釋を通じて(あるいはAntigoneと「神の法」と劇全體との關係について)
• SCHUHL, P. M., La Fabulation platonicienne, Pp. 124, Paris, Presses Univ. de France, 1947

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