Noncooperative Foundation of n-Person Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution(In Commemoration of Dr. E. Yamamoto)

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概要

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• This paper presents a noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution for an n-person bargaining problem. We show that an SSPE (stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium) payoff vector of the noncooperative bargaining model is equal to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the risk of the breakdown of negotiations is very small. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the weight of players for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the probability distribution for selecting a proposer in the bargaining game. We also provide the bargaining game model with time discounts to realize the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as an SSPE outcome.

著者

• 宮川 敏治

  関西学院大学経済学部

関連論文

• Noncooperative Foundation of n-Person Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution(In Commemoration of Dr. E. Yamamoto)
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