人格概念の再定義 : 「定言的命法」を基礎にして
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概要
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The 'personhood' argument is one of the basic principles of bioethics. But various forms are possible within this principle. The high evaluation of the patient's will is one form of personalism. The superiority of a person's value over a life's value is another form. But the famous 'personhood' argument today maintains a personhood is 'a necessary condition for the right to life'. This argument is linked with 'the denial of the right to life for potential persons' and 'the criticism against the speciesism'. This argument indeed provides some guidelines for abortion and the vegetative state, but it will admit almost any cases of the recent reproductive technology, especially ES cells. So, I want to define the person again from the viewpoint of 'moral personalism'. In this paper, I want to introduce my interpretation of Kant's 'categorical imperative', and then try to define a person on the basis of it. 'A categorical imperative' can be interpreted as 'a practical categorical syllogism'. We can discover two conditions for valid categorical syllogisms. And from these conditions moral practical laws can be deduced. Then, I define 'a person' as 'one who can perform such practical reasoning and act according to it'. A person means a moral being. This definition makes a new understanding on 'autonomy' possible, too. This definition of person is made from the viewpoint of the 'faculty', not the 'actual will'. Therefore we can consider the difference between 'a human being' and 'a chimpanzee', and also can view 'a potential person' as a person potentially possessing this faculty. This argument is not based upon a necessary condition for right to life, but upon the moral value we must esteem. I believe that from this point of view we can give some guidelines to the recent reproductive technology, ES cells.
- 2002-11-10