On the Alleged Incompatibility between Externalism and the Token Identity Theory
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概要
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It has sometimes been suggested that the token identity theory is incompatible with psychological externalism. According to the former, the content of a belief cannot be determined solely by the internal states of the subject of the belief; for certain external factors, physical and social, enter into its determination. On this view, part of what makes a belief what it is lies outside the subject. On the other hand, the token identity theory holds that each belief is identical with a physical event in the subject's brain. It seems to follow from this that the identity of a belief is completely determined by those factors that are intrinsic to the subject, and this is exactly what externalism denies. Attempts have been made by some philosophers to turn this intuitive picture of the relation between the two theses about the mind into an argument. Typically, such an argument appeals to a certain modal distinction concerning content. Very roughly, it goes as follows : No physical event is necessarily associated with a particular intentional content, whereas the intentional content of an intentional mental event is essential to it. Thus, by Leibniz's Law, no intentional mental event is identical with a physical event. The purpose of this paper is to examine this type of modal argument against the compatibility of token identity with externalism. I will argue that it employs an unwarrantedly strong assumption about the modal properties of mental events, and therefore fails to show the relevant incompatibility (at least in ways that do not beg the question against the token identity theorist).
- 科学基礎論学会の論文
- 2002-11-25