The declining influence of history in maritime security cooperation in southeast Asia: the cases of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia (COE特別号)
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概要
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For resource-poor, export-oriented states in East Asia, the security of sealanes are economic lifelines. Through the Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait flow as much as eighty percent of China's oil imports, as well as eighty percent of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan's oil and gas imports. The straits, however, are notorious for piracy, and were listed in 2005 as a perilous zone of war, terrorism, and other related perils. Although user states are more than willing to contribute, the security of the straits rests fundamentally with the three coastal states of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Sensitivities to state sovereignty are often considered as the primary impediment to regional security cooperation in general and maritime cooperation in particular. It is often argued that strong adherence to state sovereignty in the region stems from bitter colonial experience of many Southeast Asian states, including the three coastal states. However, although the three states all have colonial experience, their commitment to straits security varies. Malaysia and Indonesia have been much more sovereignty sensitive than Singapore and less willing to cooperate with extra-regional powers. Singapore, in contrast, has rarely raised the issue of sovereignty as a ground to decline cooperation and has been receptive to cooperation with external powers including Japan, its former colonial power. The divergence in the positions of the coastal states suggests not only the declining importance of historical legacy as a barrier to sea-lane security cooperation, but also that sensitivity to sovereignty may not derive so much from their colonial or historical experience. Rather than historical experience, this article advocates that the differences in levels of state development yield differences in the degree of adherence to sovereignty as well as states' willingness for cooperation. While both Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta continue to attach importance to sovereignty, the two Malay states have not only grown warmed to inviting extra-regional powers but also demonstrated greater commitment to maritime security since 2004. There are two important factors behind this: economic development and domestic political legitimacy. Evidence suggests that Malaysia and Indonesia, developing states whose overriding priority is given to state-building, became more willing to sea-lane security cooperation when their interests in economic development and political legitimacy of the governments are at stake. In short, these two factors helped to relax their susceptibility to sovereignty as well as their concern over the involvement of extra-regional powers. The state development approach suggests that until Malaysia and Indonesia evolve into developed states, it is likely that the interactions among the issues of sovereignty, economic development, and domestic political legitimacy would condition the pace of sea-lane security cooperation in Southeast Asia. One important policy implication for user states of the straits such as Japan is that success of regional maritime initiatives depends on whether such initiatives are designed in such a way to accelerate economic growth or strengthen domestic political legitimacy of the two Malay countries.