コーポレート・ガバナンスにおける情報開示の役割 : SECによる経営者報酬開示規制を中心として(コーポレート・ガバナンス・ディスクロージャーをめぐる諸問題-コーポレート・ガバナンスへの新たな接近,総合研究)

概要

論文の詳細を見る
Corporate governance cannot be carried out more efficiently without efforts to improve information disclosure. Making information more readily available to the market at large will better equip interested parties to evaluate corporate results and the appropriateness of executive decision-making. Such disclosure is particularly indispensable in the United States, where stratospheric executive compensation has come under fire. This paper examines the role that disclosure plays in the context of corporate governance. It focuses on the Securities and Exchange Commission's rule of executive compensation disclosure, which was revised in 1992. The rule change introduced a shift from narrative-based to tabular-based reporting and stipulated the provision of two new items: board compensation committee report and performance graph. The SEC's move was designed to boost the clarity of executive compensation, which have become complicated with the introduction of such elements as stock options, and to make it possible to gauge the connection between corporate results and executive compensation. This study places particular weight on the importance of the role played by board compensation committee.
日本大学の論文
1999-09-30