協調の失敗とマクロ経済分析(市場経済における不均衡分析,総合研究)

概要

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This paper examines the features characterized by coordination failures, a topic which has attracted a good deal of attention in recent Keynesian macroeconomic analyses. The model of this paper involves many agents and follows a game theoretic approach. The first part of this paper refers to the difference between cooperation failures and coordination failures, pointed out by Silvestre (1993). Then, we examine John's Lemma (see John (1995)), which gives the necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium to satisfy the condition of constrained efficiency. If the coordination of constrained efficiency is not satisfied, economy-wide inefficiency will exist, in spite of the rationality of individual decision-making. In this paper, inefficiency of this type will be considered as a macroeconomic externality. The notion of mechanism externalities or real externalities suggested by John (1995) seems to be useful for the analysis of macroeconomic externality. Interdependence among agents is also analyzed, with the reaction function derived from the first order condition of Nash equilibrium in our model. A negative slope of the reaction function exhibits strategic substitutability, while a positive slope exhibits strategic complementarity. The latter is important because strategic complementarity is a necessary condition for the multiplicity of equilibria and the existence of multiplier effects.
日本大学の論文
1997-03-01