取引費用の外部性と失業分析(市場経済における不均衡分析,総合研究)
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概要
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A very important research subject in macroeconomics is the proposal of an economic model that would explain theoretically the existence of the phenomenon of macroeconomic unemployment if prices and wages were fully flexible and correctly perceived. From this perspective, the present paper will focus especially on Howitt's transaction externality model of unemployment analysis. The purpose of this paper is to address the theoretical features derived from Howitt's model, and the connection between these and Keynesian features. A simple macroeconomy is assumed in this paper. There are only two markets: labor and output; and two types of traders: identical households and firms. Especially, it is assumed that traders are convened by an auctioneer able to find market-clearing wages and prices at no cost, but unable to arrange trade at no cost. In addition to the usual budget constraint, therefore, there is a transaction cost constraint requiring each agent to use up resources in order to maximize all his (or her) gains from trade. It is a commonplace in the non-Walrasian macroeconomic model in this paper that the per unit cost of transacting depends inversely upon the amount of activity in the market; this is known as externalities of transaction costs. The externalities of transaction costs necessarily generate inefficient and multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria in the labor market, that is to say, coordination failures phenomena. Such coordination failures, which are not completely based upon maladjustment of prices and wages, have several Keynesian features: the multiplier process, the importance of causal expectations, the fallacy of composition, and government intervention. The theoretical features of Howitt's unemployment analysis model and their implications are the inevitable consequence of an interdependence among individual decisions arising from the externalities of transaction costs.
- 1997-03-01