Transition of the Japanese Automobile Industry: Focus on the 90's
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概要
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In this section, we will conclude what the main changes in the Japanese automobile industry were in the 90's, based on the analysis findings so far. In the first half of the 90's, a significant decrease in domestic demand triggered by the collapse of the bubble economy, as well as a rapid increase in the yen's value from 1993, hit automobile manufacturers hard. In response to such changes in the business environment, automobile manufacturers carried out radical reforms and attempted to become leaner and meaner organizations. In terms of production, manufacturers worked on improving their ability to produce a wide variety of cars, as well as consolidation of unprofitable factories and production lines to eliminate excess production capacity. In terms of product design, manufacturers on the one hand worked on revising "excessive design", educing unprofitable models, promoting parts sharing and reviewing the model change cycle for certain types of cars, while on the other hand succeeding in increasing the product line of RVs that have a higher gross margin per unit and for which there was a rapidly growing demand. Thus, they succeeded in increasing the selling price per unit although the demand for the whole market was decreasing. Moreover, by promoting a simultaneous product development process utilizing 3-dimentional CAD and CAM/CAE, not only did manufacturers succeeded in minimizing development man hours and development lead time, but they also improved the ability to produce a wide variety of products ranging from sedans to RVs on a single platform (e.g., Fujimoto, 2003; Shimokawa, 2004). Parts suppliers also worked to further streamline production and design as per manufacturers' strong cost reduction requests. Some major parts suppliers worked on computerization, formulation of related systems and development of new raw materials and manufacturing techniques for making the parts smaller and lighter, by which they succeeded in increasing the added value of parts (e.g., Konno, 2004). In this way, in the early 90's, the Japanese automobile industry was forced to adapt to the post-bubble market, whose needs had radically changed in both qualitative and quantitative terms. They responded to this difficult situation well by improving their manufacturing ability. Under these conditions, in 1995 and 1996, upon recovery of domestic demand, manufacturers and parts suppliers succeeded in recovering their business performance. Many manufacturers' performance recovered, and they were content with their reform being a success. At the time, there was such opinion as "In a way, the hard times in the early 90's presented good opportunity for reducing the 'baggage' left over from the bubble period and building leaner organizations." However, the Japanese automobile industry again faced difficult times in 1997, upon the worsening of the Japanese economy. Hit hard by a financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities at the end of 1997, as well as an increase in the consumption tax from April 1998, the Japanese economy recorded its biggest slump since the war: economic growth in 1998 contracted 2.8% year-on-year, and private consumption also fell by 2,000 billion yen minus year-on-year. Under such circumstances, domestic automobile demand greatly decreased again. In 1998, the domestic automobile sales volume was 850,000 units, 12.5% less than the previous year. Since the automobile manufacturers had just recovered from market changes in the first half of the 90's, the effect of the sudden decline in domestic demand in the late 90's brought about a more challenging period for the Japanese automobile industry and its influence was much worse than the collapse of bubble economy. The decline in domestic demand hit manufacturers so hard that for some companies (e.g., Nissan) it proved devastating. The Japanese automobile manufacturers, whom had survived severe changes in the business environment by improving their manufacturing prowess, must have realized that as well as further improving their manufacturing ability, they were also required to strategically adapt to environmental changes. After this point, the manufacturers started to re-define their positioning so as to best utilize their strengths from the viewpoint of "how best to survive in the face of global competition". They have also re-built their partnerships and pressed forward with the required reforms. In 1998, when Japanese manufacturers were suffering from deteriorating business performance, Daimler of Germany and Chrysler of United States announceda transatlantic mega-merger. This triggered reorganization globally, encouraging Japanese manufacturers to take such strategic reforms. In 1998, Suzuki raised the ownership stake held by GM to 9.99%, followed by Isuzu, which increased the stake held by GM to 49.0%. Also in 1999, Nissan accepted the purchase of a 36.8% stake by Renault of France, and in December the same year, Fuji Juko accepted a 20% investment stake by GM. In March 2000, Mitsubishi accepted a 34% stake by Daimler Chrysler. On the other hand, Toyota increased its stake in Daihatsu from 34.5% to 51.2%, making Daihatsu its subsidiary in 1998. It also dispatched 3 of its previous vice-presidents to Denso Corporation, Aisin Seiki and Toyota Industries Corporation respectively. In March 2000, it increased its stake in Hino Automobile to 33.4%. As such, while some manufacturers initiate a global strategy on their own, and others play a certain role in other global companies' networks, all Japanese manufacturers nevertheless, upon entering the 21^<st> century entered an era of global competition that extends far beyond mere manufacturing. Of course, it had already been said at the beginning of the 90's that the "Automobile industry has entered the era of global competition" (e.g., Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Each manufacturer thus promoted global deployment of overseas production, and it was said that success of a corporation relied upon success of its global strategy (e.g., Tsuchiya and Oshika, 2000). Also, it must be noted that even in the 21^<st> century, we still need an improvement in manufacturing ability. However, it was a deterioration in the domestic market twice as bad as in the 90's that made manufacturers once again recognize that the real challenge is the ability to realize global strategy implementation more than their manufacturing ability per se. From this perspective, the 10 years after the collapse of the bubble economy were not necessarily a "Lost decade" for the Japanese automobile industry. They were, to varying degrees, a "Tough decade of preparation" for instilling a sense of the need to survive the global competition and implementing fast-paced management changes to this end. The Japanese automobile manufacturers made further progress in restructuring from 2000 to the first half of 2001, and became leaner organizations. Also, as stated previously, upon a worldwide boom in the automobile industry after 2001, many manufacturers' business recovered, with some even announcing record consolidated net profit. Moreover, Toyota, Nissan and Honda, are rapidly adopting aggressive measures in terms of global strategy, and they have already built up a certain ability of strategic realization comparable to major global corporations. On the other hand, the reorganization in the parts supplier industry has continued since 2001. Except for some major parts suppliers, the building of a management framework for truly surviving global competition remains only half done. In the near future, we would like to discuss transitions in the Japanese automobile industry in the 21^<st> century together with areas we did not discuss in this article, such as exports, the state of overseas production and strategies of individual companies.
- 法政大学の論文
- 2006-03-31