国際的環境技術移転における戦略的補完性の発生原因とその影響について

概要

論文の詳細を見る
In a non-cooperative game of an international environmental technology transfer program, it is quite plausible that the transfer contribution of a donor country and the accommodating effort of a recipient country are "strategic complements" to each other. In this note, we first derive the conditions under which such strategic complementarity arises within a fairly general setup. We then discuss several economic consequences to which this strategic complementarity can lead. In contrast to the case of strategic substitutes, a Stackelberg leadership always leads to Pareto improvement from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the case of strategic complements. Moreover, even a unilateral environmental action by either country could result in Pareto improvement in the presence of strategic complementarity.
関西学院大学の論文
2005-09-30