合法外国人労働者と非合法外国人労働者の労働市場への参入と経済厚生

概要

論文の詳細を見る
Using a small open economic model, we investigate the effects of legal and illegal foreign workers participation in the labor market on the economy's welfare. We assume that legal and illegal foreign workers immigrate to a small open economy, however, only a few of them can enter the labor market due to impediments to foreign worker participation in the labor market. We also assume two regimes where the union and the policy authority behave non-cooperatively and where they behave cooperatively. We show that in the case of non-cooperation, the economy's welfare, i.e., the sum of union's and policy authority's utilities, increases (decreases) as more foreign workers enter the labor market, if the ratio of legal foreign workers is high (low) and foreign workers' accessibility to the labor market is low (high). On the other hand, in the case of cooperation, we show that the economy's welfare either does not change or decreases as more foreign workers enter the labor market for any legal foreign worker ratio and foreign workers' accessibility to the labor market. An implication derived is that even if we have accepted legal and illegal foreign workers unwillingly, we can improve the economy's welfare by changing foreign workers' accessibility to the labor market. Another implication derived is that whether or not foreign worker participation to the labor market should be encouraged depends on the economy's regime.
長崎大学の論文
2004-03-25