戦略的アライアンスにおけるリスク・シェアリング
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概要
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The purpose of this study is to explain the mechanism of risk sharing in strategic alliances through a simple mathematical model. It is assumed that risk in alliances is divided into two types. One is external risk derived from the uncertainty in the product and factor markets. The other one is internal risk derived from the non-efficient use of managerial resources. The integrated risk, combining external risk and internal risk, is regarded as risk involved in making a profit on building inter-firm alliances. This study examines both (a) how the independence of risk affects risk sharing in alliances, and (b) what the measure of risk aversion and the dependency on managerial resources mean to strategic alliances. In the case of independence between markets facing both firms and between managerial resources both firms possess, risk can be efficiently shared and mitigated through interfirm alliances. One firm's share of risk depends on the other firm's measure of risk aversion under an efficient risk sharing. A firm with a large measure of risk aversion has smaller share in both profit and risk than a firm with a small measure of risk aversion does. In the case of dependence between markets facing both firms, an efficient risk sharing cannot be accomplished as compared with the case of independence. Instead, it is possible to accomplish the second best of risk sharing along the efficiency curve, if both firms can recognize partner's measure of risk aversion and trust each other without moral hazard, and if managerial resources both firms possess are qualitatively independent or heterogeneous. However, if there is a great difference in the measure of risk aversion between both firms, it may be difficult to build inter-firm alliances.
- 日本経営学会の論文
- 2000-12-20