負債,株式持ち合い,メインバンク関係と会計政策
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概要
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This paper investigates the relationships among leverage, mutual shareholdings, main bank relationships, and accounting policies using data from 1980 to 1985. First, we find that leverage and bond issue are associated with income smoothing policies. This result supports the hypothesis that firms with high leverage or issuing bond smooth income to improve investors' assessment of the probability of bankruptcy and decrease cost of debt. This implies that in debt finance, particularly bond issue, importance of accounting numbers as a monitoring device increases. Second, We find that main bank relationships are adversely associated with income smoothing policies. Given main banks monitor borrowing firms as delegated monitors, this result indicates that when firms have close tie with their main banks, the importance of accounting numbers as monitoring device decreases. Finally, we find that firms that have close tie with their financial groups smooth their income through accounting policies using securities. This result implies that poor performed firms sell mutually holding shares whose current prices are higher than historical costs and increase accounting profits. This supports the hypothesis that mutual shareholdings have risk sharing effects. These results have some implications in considering the recent change of Japanese corporate finance. First, as firms increase bond issue, the importance of accounting numbers as a monitoring device may increase and that of main bank may decrease. Second, when poorly performed firms have hidden losses in mutually holding shares, mutual shareholdings can not have risk sharing effect, so firms' incentives to keep mutual shareholdings will weaken. For same reason, the adoption of current price accounting will weaken firms' incentive to keep mutual shareholdings.
- 日本経営学会の論文
- 2000-12-20
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