非対称複占市場における脱税行動(II) : Dynamicゲーム的分析(共同研究:現代経済理論とその応用II)

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概要

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• In this paper, we analyze the risk neutral firm's tax evasion in duopoly with asymmetric production technology. In our model, we assume that each firm decides the quantity after tax evading decision, and that the firm is levied the penalty proportional to evading tax and fixed amount penalty when tax evasion is detected. We show that there exists not only the symmetric equilibrium in the sense that each firm evades (or doesn't evade) tax, but also the asymmetric equilibrium in the sense that either firm evades tax. And we show that the larger technology gap, the larger firm with inferior technology has the incentive to evading tax.

• 桃山学院大学の論文
• 2002-03-01

著者

• 中村 勝之

  本学経済学部

関連論文

• 非対称複占市場における脱税行動(II) : Dynamicゲーム的分析(共同研究:現代経済理論とその応用II)

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