グラムシ「人間とは何か」解析試論 : 『獄中ノート』における哲学的人間論の展開・その2 : (下-3・完)(特定個人研究)
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概要
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This paper analyzes the last part of the Gramsci's text. 'That a specific human society presupposes a "society of things", and that human society is possible only in so far as there exists a specific society of things, is also a commonplace. It is true that up to now the significance attributed to these supra-individual organisms (both the societas hominium and the societas rerum) has been mechanistic and determinist: hence the reaction against it. It is necessary to elaborate a doctrine in which these relations are seen as active and in movement, establishing quite clearly that the source of this activity is the consciousness of the individual man who knows, wishes, admires, creates (in so far as he does know, wish, admire, create, etc.) and conceives of himself not as isolated but rich in the possibilities offered him by other men and by the society of things of which he cannot help having a certain knowledge. (Just as every man is a philosopher, every man is a man of science, etc.).' What Gramsci suggests regarding the above commonplace is that the society of things is produced by men through their active relationship to nature; therefore, human society is an independent and autonomous one which creates its own material presupposition by itself. Thus, this commonplace loses its mechanistic and determinist significance. In the last sentence (except the parenthetical information), Gramsci describes a specific consciousness, that is, an active consciousness as a source of activity in active relations. The active consciousness is 'the consciousness of the individual man who... (acts)... in so far as he does... (act)... and conceives of himself...as... rich in the possibilities offered him.' This argument suggests the conditions of the active consciousness, which are 1. the existence of objective conditions, that is, of objective possibilities; and 2. having abilities as a subjective condition. However Gramsci clearly thinks much of the ability to know the possibilities one is offered by other beings (other men and nature) as a reflection of oneself, or the self-consciousness in which a man conceives of himself as rich in the possibilities offered him. Gramsci leaves this point as an open question to be elaborated upon. The text "What is man?" must be rethought from this point of view.
- 桃山学院大学の論文
- 2002-03-01