ハーバーマスにおける討議倫理学の基本構想
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概要
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This article tries to articulate what is embodied by the basic architecture of Habermas's discourse ethics. It goes on to analyze the ground concept and formulation of the discourse ethics that Habermas presents in the 'Chapter 3: Discourse Ethics' in his Moral Consciousness and Communicative Actions, elucidating the features of his formulation of the key concepts in discourse ethics. Habermas raises the point that J. Rawls, E. Tugendhat, K.-O. Apel and related philosophers are those heorists that adopt Kantian approach and have offered a unified interpretation of what they have attempted in his analyses of the conditions for evaluation that are based upon political impartiality and grounded on ascertained arguments. Habermas thinks of Apel's approach, i.e., his theory of discourse ethics as the most promising. This paper quotes several passages from Habermas's work that demonstrate that Habermas's approach has many affinities with Apel's discourse ethics. Their shared orientations are detectable in the fact that they both try to defend the cognitive approach to ethics against Worth Skepticisms and that they answer the questions of how moral order and norms can be founded. However, I would like to point out that gradually Habermas departs from Apel and clearly makes his own view of a discourse theory. He arrives at a conclusion to the effect that the term discourse ethics, itself is inadequate as the representation of his whole discourse theory.
- 2005-03-31